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Dividend Policy and Earnings Management Across Countries
ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether dividend policy is associated with earnings management and
whether the relationship varies across countries with wide-ranging degrees of institutional strength
and transparency. Based on a sample of 23,429 corporations from 29 countries, we show that
dividend payers manage earnings less than dividend non-payers, and that this evidence is stronger
in countries with weak investor protection and high opacity. Further, we find that dividend payers
manage earnings less when they issue equity following dividend payments, and that this result is
more pronounced in countries with weak institutions and low transparency. Overall, our evidence
suggests that firms may employ dividend policies associated with less earnings manipulation to
mitigate agency concerns and to establish credible reputation, thereby facilitating access to external
funds.
Keywords: Dividends; Earnings management; Agency problems; Investor protection; Equity is-
suance
JEL Classification Number: G15; G34; G35; G38; M41
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1. Introduction
Paying dividends limits private control benefits available to insiders as cash paid out provides fewer
opportunities to consume these benefits (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). Prior studies, however, show that
paying dividends does not prevent firms from committing accounting fraud,1 thereby suggesting
that dividend paying firms may not necessarily act in line with shareholder interests. The goal
of this study is to examine whether there is any association between dividend paying status and
earnings manipulation across firms from a broad spectrum of markets with wide-ranging degrees
of investor protection and transparency. Such a pursuit is particularly relevant as extant studies
report that non-U.S. firms may experience less pressure to maintain their dividend policies than
their U.S. counterparts.2
Prior literature finds that earnings management is less prevalent when private control benefits
are limited (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012). Thus, firm managers who
decide to pay dividends may have fewer private control benefits to consume and conceal and hence,
could be less likely to fabricate accounting information. Furthermore, both theory and empirical
evidence indicate that the U.S. firms are unwilling to cut dividends, and that they engage in
dividend smoothing to maintain a constant stream of dividends (e.g., Lintner, 1956; Brav et al.,
2005; Skinner and Soltes, 2011). However, non-U.S. firms appear to be less concerned about
dividend cuts and thus alter their dividend policies more frequently (e.g., Dewenter and Warther,
1998; Chemmanur et al., 2010; Hail, Tahoun, and Wang, 2013). Such evidence implies that the
relationship between dividend paying status and earnings management may not persist or may be
weaker in an international setting. Alternatively, it is plausible that the link between dividend
policy and earnings management is stronger in a cross-country examination. This may be due
to a large variation in country-level investor protection measures (e.g., Jensen, 1986; La Porta
1For example, in their sample of 330 fraud-accused firms spanning between 1982 and 2005, Caskey and Hanlon
(2013) find that 72 alleged fraud firms paid out $20 billion in dividends while simultaneously committing accounting
fraud.
2See, for example, Brav et al. (2005); Dewenter and Warther (1998); Chemmanur et al. (2010); Hail, Tahoun,
and Wang (2013); Lintner (1956); Skinner and Soltes (2011).
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et al., 2000). Specifically, such differences may result in a potentially stronger need of foreign
firms to convey their governance quality via alternative credible signals, compared to their U.S.
counterparts.3 We therefore conjecture that dividend paying firms manipulate earnings less than
their non-paying counterparts and that the strength of the relationship may vary with country-level
investor protection and transparency.
Our analyses focus on the following three closely related issues. First, we examine the relation-
ship between dividend policy and earnings management. We gauge a firm’s earnings management
by the magnitude of its abnormal accruals with a larger magnitude of abnormal accruals indicating
more aggressive earnings management. We test the relationship on a large cross-section of 23,429
firms, whose dividend policies vary substantially across 29 countries, over a 21-year period from
1990 to 2010. Second, our analyses exploit the richness of our data by examining whether and how
the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management differs across countries with
varying degrees of investor protection and transparency. Third, our study attempts to provide fur-
ther insights regarding the observed variation of the dividends-earnings management relationship
with investor protection. We do so by examining the established link in the context of subsequent
access to external financing.
We find that dividend payers have smaller abnormal accruals than dividend non-payers, sug-
gesting that the former are less likely to engage in aggressive accruals management to conceal
firm performance. These results are economically significant, even after controlling for firm-specific
variables that have previously been shown to affect earnings management. For example, our model
estimates indicate that the size of abnormal accruals for dividend payers is 7% smaller than that
for non-payers. Our findings are also robust to subsamples of U.S. and non-U.S. firms; subsample
periods of 1990s and 2000s; subsamples partitioned by firm size, dividend volatility, and cash flow
volatility; subsamples focusing on dividend changes - initiations and omissions as well as increases
and decreases; subsamples of dividend payers and non-papers with at least 10 or 20 years of data;
3See Fan and Wong (2005); Choi and Wong (2007); Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006); Francis et al. (2005),
among others.
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and to the various alternative measures of payouts and of earnings management. We also conduct
several additional robustness tests that focus on the samples matched by selected firm character-
istics, propensity score matching, and fixed effects regressions. All results persist as we employ
these alternative estimation approaches. Overall, we offer strong evidence that paying dividends is
associated with and leads to lower earnings management.
We next examine whether the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management
differs across countries with varying degrees of institutional strength. Based on a global sample
of firms, La Porta et al. (2000) find evidence that dividend payouts are strongly associated with
minority shareholder rights.4 Such evidence supports their hypothesis that dividend payments are
“an outcome of an effective system of legal protection of shareholders.” Alternatively, firms could
pay dividends to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard issues (e.g., Hail et al., 2014). If firms
paying dividends are associated with less earnings manipulation to alleviate country-level agency
issues, we expect the negative relationship between dividend paying status and earnings manage-
ment to be more pronounced in firms from countries that are susceptible to greater agency conflicts.
The results are consistent with the prediction that dividend paying status is associated with lower
earnings management, especially in countries with weak institutions and low transparency.
Lastly, we attempt to further explain why the negative link between dividend policy and earnings
management is more pronounced in countries with weak investor protection and high opacity. One
plausible explanation is that dividend policy associated with low earnings manipulation conveys the
management’s intention to forgo private control benefits and to build reputation that will facilitate
future access to capital markets (La Porta et al., 2000). This is particularly important for firms
that want to maintain their ability to raise funds in capital markets, particularly in less financially
developed ones. Our evidence supports the above conjecture. The results indicate that the negative
link between dividend policy and earnings management is more pronounced in firms that implement
equity issuances in one to three years subsequent to the time of dividend payments, notably in those
4Bartram et al. (2012) extend La Porta et al.’s sample and reach the same conclusion.
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from countries with lower legal protection and higher opacity.
Our study contributes to the finance and accounting literature in several directions. First, to
the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to offer robust international evidence on the
link between dividend policy and earnings management. Extant literature establishes that firms
from countries with weak institutions have lower dividend payouts (La Porta et al., 2000) and that
earnings management is more prevalent in developing than in developed economies (e.g., Leuz et
al., 2003; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012; Lang et al., 2006). We contribute to this literature by
providing evidence that dividend payers exhibit lower levels of earnings management across both
developed and emerging markets, especially so in the latter economies.
Second, our paper offers significant insights into the role of dividends-earnings management
link in the context of agency concerns. La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that effective legal systems
empower minority shareholders to force insiders to disgorge cash, but provide no explanation for
why a large proportion of firms, even in countries with low investor protection, still pay dividends.
Our results offer a plausible explanation for why firms from countries with weak investor protection
and low transparency pay dividends that are strongly associated with less earnings manipulation.
These firms may commit to dividend payments thereby consuming and concealing fewer private
control benefits in line with less aggressive earnings management. They may do so to demonstrate
commitment to shareholder interests and establish reputation in the marketplace.
Finally, our work contributes to the growing literature on the effect of institutional factors
on firm behavior in international markets. Leuz et al. (2003) find that weak investor protection
allows insiders to consume more private control benefits and to manage earnings more aggressively.
La Porta et al. (2000) and Faccio et al. (2001) report that firms pay less dividends if country
governance does not effectively constrain insiders from expropriating minority shareholders. Our
study adds to this literature by showing that firms operating in countries with weak legal regimes
might optimally choose to employ dividends to underscore their intention to forgo private control
benefits, via the negative link to earnings manipulation, and do so to facilitate access to external
4
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funds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation of our study
and develops a number of testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and explains the
construction of various earnings management measures and control variables. Section 4 tests the
relationship between dividend policy and earnings management. Section 5 examines whether the
dividends-earnings management relationship varies across countries with different degrees of in-
vestor protection and transparency. This section also explores the relationship between dividend
paying status and earnings management in the context of subsequent equity issuance. The final
section concludes.
2. Motivation and hypotheses development
2.1. Dividend policy and earnings management
Information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors give rise to agency con-
cerns (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Existing studies recognize that managers have incentives to
keep excess cash, because this affords them the opportunity to misappropriate or waste corporate
resources for personal benefits at the expense of outside investors.5 If profits are not paid out
to shareholders, they may be diverted by insiders for personal use or directed into unprofitable
investments (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006; Denis and Osobov,
2008). Dividend non-paying firms may thus be prone to exploit corporate resources for personal
interests.
In contrast, theory posits that in imperfect markets, firm managers use dividends as a means
to resolve agency-based conflicts between insiders and the outside shareholders (Jensen, 1986).
Dividends reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and minimize suboptimal managerial behavior
(Easterbrook, 1984). Extant agency theories postulate that dividends may be important in an
agency context in the following two manners. First, dividend policy may be the outcome of an
5See, for example, Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), and La Porta et al. (2000).
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efficient contracting under which minority shareholders force the company insiders to disgorge
cash, thereby limiting any potentially suboptimal managerial behavior (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000;
Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006). Second, dividends may
be employed to convey a firm’s commitment to act in the best interests of outside investors and
thus attenuate the agency concerns (e.g., Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Lang and
Litzenberger, 1989; Allen, Bernardo, and Welch, 2000; La Porta et al., 2000; Myers, 2000). Thus,
firms paying dividends limit private control benefits available to insiders, as cash paid out provides
fewer opportunities for insiders to consume these benefits (Pinkowitz et al., 2006).
Notably, a strand of literature also documents that consumption of private control benefits by
the company insiders is positively associated with earnings manipulation. Specifically, Leuz et al.
(2003) argue that misrepresentation of accounting information could arise from the incentives of
insiders and controlling shareholders to camouflage their private control benefits and document
evidence that earnings management is less pervasive when these benefits are limited.6 Gopalan and
Jayaraman (2012) compare earnings management practices of insider and non-insider controlled
firms and conclude that earnings management is more prevalent in the former category of firms as
consumption of private control benefits is higher in these firms. We therefore expect that dividend
paying firms may choose to limit their private control benefits consumption and may subsequently
have fewer incentives to conceal these benefits. Dividend payers may thus be less inclined to distort
their true economic performance via earnings manipulation.
The discussions above give rise to our first hypothesis:
H1: Dividend policy is negatively associated with earnings management.
6Specifically, the authors show that insiders can use their discretion in financial reporting to overstate reported
earnings to cover up a loss that might prompt outsiders to question and intervene. Alternatively, if earnings are
unexpectedly high, insiders can divert more assets to themselves and report lower earnings by overstating expenses.
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2.2. Dividends-earnings management link and institutional strength across countries
Prior literature suggests that non-U.S. firms alter their dividend policies more often than do their
U.S. counterparts. For example, Dewenter and Warther (1998) show that Japanese firms are more
inclined to omit or decrease dividends and that their dividends are more responsive to reported
earnings. Chemmanur et al. (2010) compare dividend policies of U.S. versus Hong Kong firms and
find that the latter employ more flexible dividend policies and engage less in dividend smoothing.
Hail, Tahoun, and Wang (2014) report that in a sample of 38 countries from 1993 to 2008, the U.S.
firms exhibit the lowest incidence of dividend decreases at 9.4%, relative to the sample average of
16.5%. It is therefore plausible that the relationship between dividend paying status and earnings
management may not persist or may be weaker for non-U.S. firms.
Alternatively, it is plausible that the link between dividend policy and earnings management
varies with country-level investor protection and transparency measures. Specifically, a growing
strand of literature emphasizes that firms operating in countries with weak legal institutions at-
tempt to employ alternative mechanisms to convey their commitment to shareholder interests and
maintain credibility in the financial markets. For example, based on a sample of firms from eight
East Asian economies, Fan and Wong (2005) demonstrate that firms with agency problems inherent
in their ownership structures are more likely to hire a BigN auditor, and that this choice bears
positive value implications. The authors further conclude that a BigN auditor undertakes a cor-
porate governance role in emerging markets. Choi and Wong (2007) show that the appointment
of a high quality auditor plays a more important governance role in firms from countries with
weak legal institutions than in those from countries with strong legal protection. Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson (2006) find that the relationship between dividends and firm value is stronger in
countries with weak investor protection.
We thus predict that foreign firms may employ dividend policies with an intent to consume and
conceal fewer private control benefits as demonstrated by a stronger negative link between dividend
policy and earnings manipulation. Notably, Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) and Gopalan and
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Jayaraman (2012) find that firms from countries with weak investor protection manage earnings
more aggressively. In light of such evidence, it is interesting to evaluate whether dividends-earnings
management relationship is amplified in environments that are more prone to manifest agency
problems.
Combined, the existing findings documented above give rise to our second hypothesis:
H2: The dividends-earnings management relationship is more pronounced in firms from coun-
tries with poor legal protection or low transparency.
To further understand why the link between dividend policy and earnings management is more
pronounced in firms from countries with weak institutions and high opacity, we focus on a firm’s
access to capital markets for external funds. Specifically, we contend that if firms indeed employ
dividend policies with a strong intent to consume fewer private control benefits as reflected in a
decreased inclination to manipulate earnings, these firms may do so to establish reputation as they
must be attempting to facilitate external financing (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000).
The increasing body of literature suggests that firms may employ alternative governance mech-
anisms to mitigate their agency concerns in order to subsequently gain access to external funds.
For instance, Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2009) find that firms hiring a BigN auditor are more
likely to issue equity and to have larger equity issues. The authors further show that the difference
between the firms employing BigN auditors versus those employing non-BigN auditors narrows
when market conditions improve. In their 2006 study, the three authors show that firms with
greater analyst coverage are more likely to issue equity and also do so more frequently than their
counterparts with fewer analysts following. Fan and Wong (2005) demonstrate that firms with
agency problems pertinent to their ownership structures are more likely to employ a BigN auditor,
and that the relationship is more pronounced in firms that raise equity frequently. All these find-
ings suggest that the role of alternative mechanisms to convey commitment to shareholder interests
may strengthen in firms interested in accessing the external market, especially in those with fewer
country-level means to do so.
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The evidence in the preceding discussion leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: The dividends-earnings management relationship is more pronounced in firms that subse-
quently issue equity, especially in those from countries with poor legal protection or low
transparency.
3. Data and variable construction
3.1. Sample construction
This subsection briefly describes the construction of our sample and key variables. We obtain stock
returns and financial data from Datastream and WorldScope. Our sample period spans from 1990
to 2010. To be included in the sample, we require that (i) a firm must have non-missing accounting
data for calculating earnings management measures and control variables; and (ii) a country must
have at least 50 firms with non-missing data in a given year. These requirements result in 174,340
firm-year observations for 23,429 non-financial firms across 29 countries. Specifically, our sample
comprises 18 developed (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K.,
and the U.S.) and 11 emerging markets (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey).
To capture dividend policy, our analysis employs an indicator variable that takes the value of
one if the firm pays dividends, and zero if otherwise. This indicator allows us to exploit the distinct
role of dividends between dividend payers and non-payers. We, however, verify the robustness of
our findings to alternative continuous measures, such as dividend payout ratios and dividend-price
ratios, and find consistent results.
Previous studies have shown that insiders and managers use accounting accruals opportunisti-
cally to distort the true economic performance and mislead outside investors in various occasions,
including equity issuances (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a, 1998b), bond issuances (Caton et al.,
2011), and stock option exercises (Bartov and Mohanram, 2004). As there exists no uniformly supe-
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rior measure of earnings management, our analysis employs three key metrics that have been widely
studied in the accounting and finance literature, the construction of which is described in detail in
Appendix A. These measures are - (i) the absolute value of residuals from Jones’ (1991) abnormal
accruals model, Accr(J); (ii) the standard deviation of residuals from Dechow and Dichev’s (2002)
accruals model, Accr(D); and (iii) the standard deviation of residuals from Francis et al.’s (2005)
accruals model, Accr(F ). While each measure has its own strengths and weaknesses (Dechow, Ge,
and Schrand, 2011), using three different measures will provide more robustness to our findings.
In addition, in selected tests, we supplement these measures by exploiting subsamples of positive
versus negative Jones’ (1991) accruals, as well as employing probability of small profits and prob-
ability of small earnings per share increases, as alternative metrics of earnings management. We
interpret that larger Accr(J), as well as larger variation of Accr(D) and Accr(F ), indicate more
aggressive earnings management.
3.2. Univariate statistics
This subsection presents some basic statistics pertinent to our key variables. Table 1 shows the
cross-country distribution for the starting year of the sample period, number of unique firms,
number of firm-year observations, average proportion of firms that pay dividends,7 average dividend-
price ratio, and average of each earnings management measure. The starting year reflects the data
availability for computing earnings management measures for each country. Many of the developed
countries have data available starting from 1990, whereas among the emerging markets, Malaysia
has the longest data available from 1993. Correspondingly, the numbers of unique firms and firm-
year observations are larger for the former than for the latter. The number of unique firms ranges
from 91 in Turkey with 471 firm-year observations to 7,989 unique firms in the U.S. with 60,969
firm-year observations. Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. contribute about 63% of the total number
of observations, with the U.S. alone accounting for 35%. In our robustness tests, we exclude the
U.S. or all these three countries from our analysis, and the results remain unaltered.
7The average proportion of firms that pay dividends is computed based on firm-year observations in each country.
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The proportion of dividend payers is between 36.5% (U.S.) and 88.6% (Japan), with a cross-
country average of 59.6%. The small proportion of dividend payers in the U.S. may reflect the
findings of Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Skinner (2008), who report the increasing use of stock
repurchases by U.S. corporations as an alternative payout mechanism, especially in recent years. In
other words, their results imply that U.S. firms are distributing less dividends to their shareholders.
To determine the time trend in dividend payers, we also report the proportions of dividend
payers for two almost equal subperiods: 1990-1999 and 2000-2010. We find evidence of a significant
16.1% decline in the proportion of the U.S. firms that pay dividends, from 46.1% in the first
subperiod to 30.0% in the second. The overall drop in the fraction of dividend payers across the
two subperiods is 12.1%; the drop is more pronounced among developed markets (14.4%), compared
with only 7.7% fall in emerging markets. Similarly, the average dividend-price ratio for developed
markets is 1.5% while it is 2.4% for emerging economies, with a cross-country average of 1.6%,
which ranges from 0.8% (U.S.) to 4.1% (Thailand). Interestingly, such results are consistent with
those of Fama and French (2001), who focus on U.S. markets and subsequent studies such as Fatemi
and Bildik (2012) who examine the world markets. Fama and French find that the percentage of
dividend payers declines over time due to the increasing number of new listings of small firms
with low profitability and strong growth opportunities. Fatemi and Bildik provide corroborating
evidence from a sample of more than 17,000 companies from 33 different countries; they show a
significant worldwide decline in the propensity to pay dividends due to the payout policies of smaller
and less profitable firms with relatively more investment opportunities.
The cross-country averages of earnings management measures are 0.057, 0.045, and 0.042 for
Accr(J), Accr(D), and Accr(F ), respectively. While Japan displays the lowest level of earnings
management across all three metrics, Poland exhibits the highest based on Accr(J) and Australia
also shows the highest based on Accr(D) and Accr(F ). While Accr(J) average is lower for developed
countries at 0.055 compared to 0.064 for emerging markets, Accr(D) and Accr(F ) averages are
somewhat higher for developed markets at 0.046 and 0.042 than for emerging markets at 0.043 and
11
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0.038, respectively.
Table 2 presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of each earnings management mea-
sure for dividend payers and non-payers. It also reports p-values associated with the t-test for mean
difference and the Wilcoxon test for median difference between the two groups of firms. Drawn
from the extant literature, our subsequent multivariate analyses also control for variables that have
shown to affect earnings management: firm size (MV ); total assets (TA); free cash flow (FCF );
book-to-market equity ratio (BM); leverage (DE); sales growth (Salesg); firm age (Age); long-
term tangible assets (PPE); profitability (ROA); an IAS dummy (IAS); a BigN dummy (BigN);
closely-held ownership (Chold); and an ADR dummy (ADR). Means and medians of these control
variables, as well as their differences between dividend payers and non-payers, are depicted in Table
2, with the details of their construction in Appendix B.
Based on the t− andWilcoxon tests, all the variables are statistically and significantly different
across dividend payers and non-payers at the 1% level, except for the mean difference in leverage
at the 5% level. The univariate statistics show that all earnings management metrics are higher for
dividend non-payers than for dividend payers, suggesting that the former engage in more aggressive
earnings manipulation than the latter. The differences in the magnitude of these metrics provide
preliminary univariate evidence that dividend policy relates negatively to earnings management in
an international setting.
Dividend payers also tend to be larger, older, more profitable, exhibit lower sales growth, larger
free cash flow, have higher long-term tangible assets, book-to-market equity ratios, and larger
closely-held ownership, compared with their dividend non-paying counterparts. Furthermore, there
are larger proportions of IAS adopters and of ADR issuers, while a smaller proportion of BigN
adopters, among dividend payers than non-payers. These observations are broadly in line with
evidence in the existing literature pertinent to dividend determinants.8
8For instance, Fama and French (2001); Grullon and Michaely (2002); La Porta et al. (2000); Denis and Osobov
(2008), among others.
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Table 3 reports Pearson cross-correlation coefficients of the variables employed in our study. All
earnings management measures - Accr(J), Accr(D), and Accr(F ), are significantly correlated with
Div, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays dividends in year t, and 0 if otherwise.
The correlation coefficients of earnings management variables with Div are consistent with our
expectation that dividend paying firms exhibit lower levels of earnings manipulation. Dividend
paying status, Div, is significantly positively correlated with firm size, total assets, free cash flow,
book-to-market equity ratio, leverage, firm age, long-term assets, profitability, IAS dummy, ADR
issuance, and closely held ownership, while significantly negatively correlated with sales growth
and BigN adopters. In general, the correlation coefficients between the variables in our sample
are moderately low, suggesting no evidence of multicollinearity. One exception is the correlation
coefficient of 0.87 between total assets (TA) and market value (MV ). To capture firm size, we thus
only include MV in regressions. However, the unreported regression results, which employ both
TA and MV as control characteristics, remain unchanged.
4. Dividend policy and earnings management
4.1. Assessing the relationship
In this subsection, we examine the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management
in a multivariate setting. Specifically, we conduct cross-sectional analyses by regressing a proxy
for earnings management, Accr(J), on a dividend indicator, Div, while controlling for firm-specific
variables, Xi (i = 1, ..., N ), that have previously been found to affect earnings management, inclu-
sive of prior year’s Accr(J), as well as for country, industry, and year fixed effects,
Accr(J)t+1 = a+ bDivt +
N∑
i
citXit + Fixed Effects + ǫt+1. (1)
Equation (1) forms our baseline regression throughout this study, where the key explanatory vari-
able Div is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm pays dividends in year t, and 0 if
otherwise. We employ Jones’ (1991) absolute value of residuals (Accr(J)) as a proxy for earnings
management in (1), computed in year t + 1. Accr(J) gauges the extent to which a firm manages
13
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its earnings with the larger accruals metric indicative of more aggressive earnings management.
Therefore, if our hypothesis H1 is true, then the b coefficient should be negative, implying that
dividend payers are less inclined to manipulate their earnings.
Firm-level regression results of Equation (1) and its variants are presented in Table 4. All
these regression models incorporate a multitude of firm-level control variables, including the lagged
Accr(J); firm size (MV ); free cash flow (FCF ); book-to-market equity ratio (BM); sales growth
(Salesg); firm age (Age); leverage (DE); long-term tangible assets (PPE); profitability (ROA); a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm prepares its financial statements in accordance
with International Accounting Standards (IAS); a dummy indicator that takes the value of 1 if the
firm employs a BigN auditor (BigN); a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has issued American
Depository Receipts (ADR); and closely-held ownership (Chold).9 Throughout the study, all
multivariate regressions also include country, industry, and year fixed effects (as applicable), and
all associated p-values are computed based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
firm-level clustering. Also, all accruals measures have been multiplied by 100 and deflated by total
assets, and are thus reflected as a percentage of total assets.
Models M1-M3 focus on the entire sample of firms from 29 countries. Model M1 shows the
relationship between earnings management and Div alone, while model M2 presents the relationship
with the lagged Accr(J) alone. Model M3 expands model M1 by adding controls for the various
firm characteristics. We control for the lagged Accr(J), separately in model M2, and together with
Div and the other controls in model M3, to assure that the link between Div and Accr(J) is not
driven by an omitted time-invariant determinant of earnings management. Models M4 and M5
examine the potential differential effects of the relationship between dividend policy and earnings
management for the U.S. versus non-U.S. firms. Models M6 and M7 separate out the possible
differences in the relationship during the 1990s versus the 2000s.
Consistent with our expectations, the results highlight a negative, statistically significant rela-
9For example, see Becker et al. (1998); Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006); Francis and Wong (2008); Barth,
Landsman, and Lang (2008), among others.
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tionship between dividend policy, as measured by dividend paying status, and earnings management
across all models. For instance, the coefficient of Div in model M4 is -0.487 and highly significant
at the 1% level, reflecting close to 0.5% decrease in abnormal accruals for firms paying dividends.
Based on the Accr(J) mean for dividend non-payers of 0.075, this coefficient is also economically
significant as it implies that accruals are about 7% smaller for dividend payers, compared to those
of non-payers. It is also noteworthy that the adjusted R-squared increases from 7.2 percent in
model M1, where Div is the only explanatory variable, to 17.3 percent in model M3, which also ac-
counts for all the firm characteristics. The adjusted R-squared of 13.1 percent in model M2, where
Accr(J)L is the only regressor, underscores that the lagged Accr(J) contributes substantially to
such an increase.
While both negative and highly significant, the estimate of Div in model M3 is lower than its
counterpart in M5, suggesting that paying dividends in non-U.S. firms decreases earnings manage-
ment to a larger degree than it does in the U.S. firms. In two unreported tests, we further find that
the difference between the coefficients of Div in these two models, and that the interaction term
of dividend policy and non-U.S. firms when focusing on the full sample of firms, are both strongly
significant. Such findings imply that earnings management is more sensitive to dividend policy in
non-U.S. firms than in the U.S. firms. This result also verifies that our key finding is not driven
by the large proportion of the U.S. firms in the sample. The magnitudes of the coefficients of Div
in models M6 and M7 (-0.621 and -0.427, respectively) suggest that dividend payers exhibit lower
earnings management during the 1990s than during 2000s. Both estimates are strongly significant
at conventional levels, confirming that our key finding is insensitive to the subsample periods.
The results on the control characteristics are broadly consistent with those of other studies.10
Specifically, larger, older, more profitable firms, firms with higher book-to-market equity ratios,
leverage, and higher long-term tangible assets, and those hiring a BigN auditor are likely to exhibit
lower earnings management. In contrast, firms with higher sales growth, with larger proportion
10See, for example, Becker et al. (1998); Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006); Francis and Wong (2008); Barth,
Landsman, and Lang (2008).
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of closely-held shares, and those that issued ADRs are more prone to be associated with stronger
earnings manipulation. The signs of estimates of IAS and of FCF are mixed or insignificant.
In summary, we have established a strong negatively significant association between dividend
paying status and earnings management, while controlling for factors that have shown to be related
to earnings management as well as for country, year, and industry fixed effects. The negative
association is also robust across the various subsamples. Such a relationship is consistent with our
conjecture that firms may employ dividend policies as they have a desire to consume and conceal
fewer private control benefits, thereby exhibiting fewer incentives to manipulate their earnings. The
results therefore render support for the dividends-earnings management relationship across a wide
range of firms from 29 developed and emerging markets that differ vastly in the degrees of strength
of legal institutions and investor protection.
4.2. Robustness tests
We recognize that dividend policy may be endogenously determined as firms self-select based on
the various characteristics such as earned/contributed capital mix, agency conflicts, profitability,
or investment opportunities, among others (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2004; DeAn-
gelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Chay and Suh, 2009). In our baseline
regressions in Table 4, we attempt to mitigate the endogeneity concerns by regressing the earnings
management measures on the lagged dividend policy, while also controlling for the lagged earnings
management and earnings variables, and obtain robust results. Importantly, however, it is also
plausible that dividend payments are an outcome of the past earnings which in turn may be related
to accruals metrics, and we do not aim to rule out such reverse causality possibilities.
To further address the endogeneity concerns, we employ six different tests and present the results
in Table 5. We employ Accr(D) as the dependent variable in model M1, Accr(J) in all other models,
except models M20-M24, where we use the remaining alternative earnings management proxies, as
elaborated below. In unreported models, we also employ all three earnings management measures
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- Accr(J), Accr(D), and Accr(F ) for all tests, as applicable, and obtain consistent results.
First, we replicate the baseline regression (1), shown in model M3 of Table 4, while controlling
for firm fixed effects. Such an approach allows us to verify whether our findings are driven by
unobserved time-invariant attributes that cause firms to self-select into dividend payers. The result
in model M1 underscores a negative Div coefficient that is significant at the 1% level, suggesting
that the relationship between dividend paying status and earnings management persists and is
insensitive to controlling for firm fixed effects.
Second, we investigate whether dividend paying status indeed represents the link between div-
idend payments and earnings management rather than captures other effects on earnings manipu-
lation. For example, one could argue that dividend payers are normally large firms, exhibit strong
dividend stability, and low cash flow volatility. A plausible expectation thus arises that firms with
the above characteristics are associated with lower accruals-based earnings manipulation. It is thus
also possible that the role of dividend paying status in earnings manipulation is subsumed once
the effects of these characteristics are examined in greater detail. Although we carefully control for
earnings management determinants in all regressions, certain non-linearities may affect the reported
relationships.
To address this concern, we partition dividend payers as well as dividend non-payers into large
and small by the median firm size (MV ), dividend payers into those with high and low dividend
volatility as well as payers and non-payers into those with high and low cash flow volatility by their
respective medians for each country and year. We calculate dividend and cash flow volatilities as
standard deviations of dividends or of free cash flows, respectively, in the previous eight years and
require a minimum of five years of data. We replicate the baseline regression (1), while estimate
the tests separately for each partition. To conserve space, we report the results of the estimations
which include the differential effects of Div with Large Size, High Div V ol, or with High CF V ol
in models M2-M4, respectively. The coefficients of Div are negative and strongly significant, and
those of the differential effects indicate that small dividend payers or those with high cash flow
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volatility exhibit less earnings manipulation than do their counterparts of larger size or with lower
cash flow volatility. The differential effect pertinent to dividend volatility is insignificant. Also,
the results of unreported models which separately focus on large and small firms, those with high
and low dividend and cash flow volatilities underscore negatively significant coefficients of Div at
the 1% level across all models. Combined, the above results offer a strong evidence that the effect
of dividend paying status on earnings management is distinct and persists when conditioned on
measures which could be closely associated with dividend paying status.
Third, we examine the effects of various changes in dividend policy on earnings management.
In models M5 and M6, we assess the effects of dividend initiation and omission, respectively, on
a change in earnings manipulation. We designate Initiation in model M5, a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the firm does not pay dividends in year t − 1, while initiates dividend
payments in year t, and continues to pay dividends in year t + 1. In model M6, we incorporate
Omission - a dummy indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm distributes dividends in year
t − 1, but eliminates dividends in year t, and continues to not pay dividends in year t + 1. We
estimate a panel OLS regression that is similar to that of Table 4, except that the dependent
variable now represents the change in earnings management metrics from year t to year t + 1,
and the key explanatory variables are Initiation (M5) or Omission (M6). The control variables
incorporate changes in the firm characteristics, calculated in the same manner as is the change in
the dependent variable. Our sample contains 3,284 firm-year observations associated with dividend
initiations and 2,770 firm-year observations pertinent to dividend omissions. To be included in the
sample, we require that firms have a total of eight years of non-missing information centered on
dividend initiation/omission event (i.e., from year t− 4 to year t+ 4).
If dividend paying status is predictive of lower earnings management, we expect a negative
(positive) change in earnings management following a dividend initiation (omission). The result
in model M5 is consistent with our prediction. The estimate of Initiation coefficient is negative
and statistically significant. Model M6, however, underscores statistically insignificant coefficient
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of Omission. It is thus evident that employing a dividend policy results in lower earnings man-
agement, whereas there is no evidence to suggest that dividend omissions lead to more aggressive
earnings management. Such finding is in line with prior literature that establishes that the role of
dividend cuts in firm performance is ambiguous. For instance, Grullon et al. (2005) document that
dividend cuts do not relate to future firm performance. Instead, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler
(1997), Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), and Healy and Palepu (1988) report increased
earnings subsequent to a dividend cut, while DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992) find that
firms cut dividends after a period of underperformance.
We are further interested to examine whether the dividend decreases and increases relate to or
exhibit varied impacts on earnings manipulation. In model M7, we construct an indicator variable,
Decrease, which takes the value of 1 if a firm decreases its dividend payments from year t − 1 to
year t, and 0 if otherwise. In model M8, we incorporate Increase - a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if a firm increases its dividend payments from year t− 1 to year t, and 0 if otherwise.
We estimate a panel OLS regression that is similar to that of Table 4, while also includes the
interaction terms of Decrease and Increase with Div in models M7 and M8, respectively. The
results underscore negative significant coefficients of Div in both models M7 and M8, while those
of the differential effects are insignificant. Such findings indicate that the effect of divided policy
on earnings manipulation persists and is insensitive to dividend decreases or increases. Such results
corroborate those of Skinner and Soltes (2011). The authors find that the relationship between
dividends and earnings persistence is unrelated to the magnitude of dividends thereby underscoring
the effect of the dividend paying status rather than of the dividend payment amount.
We next focus on the subsamples of dividend payers and non-payers which persist in their
respective dividend paying status for at least 10 years in model M9, and for at least 20 years
in model M10. In all other tests throughout the study, we assure that the survivorship bias is
minimized and thus do not restrict our samples based on time periods or availability of measures.
We, however, recognize that firms may change from dividend payers to dividend non-payers and
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vice versa. We are thus interested to assess whether the relationship between dividend paying
status and earnings management persists in subsamples that restrict firms to a dividend paying
status for a certain period of time. We estimate regressions similar to those of Table 4, while focus
on the subsamples with at least 10 years of data in a dividend paying status in model M9, and with
at least 20 years of data in a dividend paying status in model M10. We obtain 73,053 and 4,980
firm-year observations in models M9 and M10, respectively. Our results of the negative significant
coefficients of Div remain unaltered in both models M9 and M10. Our key finding of the negative
link between dividend paying status and earnings management is thus insensitive to firms changing
between dividend payers and non-payers.
Fourth, we undertake the propensity score matching approach to mitigate the concern that
the observable firm characteristics associated with the dividend paying status cause differences
in the relationship between dividend paying status and earnings management. In the first stage,
we model the likelihood of dividend paying status for each country-year, to obtain propensity
scores; the logistic regression includes MV , FCF , Salesg, ROA, and industry fixed effects. We
next employ the propensity score-matched sample to estimate the OLS regression of the effect of
dividend paying status on earnings manipulation, and report the results in model M11. The finding
is consistent with our expectation that divided payers exhibit less earnings management than do
their dividend non-paying counterparts. To complement this finding, we also match dividend payers
with non-payers based on country, industry, and year fixed effects as well as on one of the following
firm characteristics - MV , FCF , Salesg, Age, or ROA,
11 and report the regression results in
models M12-M16, respectively. The coefficients of Div are negative and strongly significant at the
1% level across all models, thus reinforcing the negative link between dividend paying status and
earnings manipulation.
Fifth, we employ alternative measures of dividend policy to verify whether the relationship be-
tween dividend paying status and earnings management persists. Models M17 and M18 employ the
11We restrict firms to those with positive return on assets.
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dividend-price ratio (Div/P ) and dividend payout ratio (Div/E), respectively. With the increased
popularity of repurchases as a means to distribute cash flows to outside investors (e.g., Grullon,
Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002; Skinner, 2008), we also exploit share repurchases (Repur) as an
alternative proxy for payout to shareholders and report the results in model M19. The results in
models M17-M19 further indicate that employing dividend-price ratio, dividend payout ratio, and
share repurchases as alternative dividend policy/payout constructs, renders no effect on our key
finding of a negative relationship between the dividend paying status and earnings management. In
an unreported test, we exclude firms with negative dividend payout ratios and obtain qualitatively
similar results.
Finally, we re-examine the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management
while exploiting the alternative metrics of earnings manipulation. It is plausible that managers
may prefer either earnings-increasing or earnings-decreasing manipulation. To disentangle the po-
tential differential effects of these two types of earnings management behavior, we partition the
sample by the sign of Jones’ (1991) abnormal accruals. Model M20 focuses on the subsample of
income-increasing/positive accruals (PAccr), while model M21 examines the partition of income-
decreasing/negative accruals (NAccr). Model M22 focuses on Accr(F ), while models M23 and
M24 exploit the probabilities of small profits - Prob(S), and of small earnings per share increases
- Prob(SEPS), respectively. The latter two measures focus on management’s incentives to ma-
nipulate earnings to beat target earnings (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Dechow, Ge,
and Schrand, 2011). Specifically, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argue that managers have strong
incentives to avoid reporting a loss or a decrease in earnings. Further, studies document that re-
porting a small profit to avoid losses is associated with earnings management using discretionary
loss reserves in insurance companies (e.g., Beaver et al., 2003) or deferred tax expenses (e.g., Philips
et al., 2003).
The results in models M20-M24 provide further support to our key findings. While the dividend-
earnings management relationship is stronger for negative than for positive accruals, models M20
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and M21 indicate that dividend payers are less likely to manage earnings, either upward or down-
ward. Using three alternative measures of earnings management as dependent variables in models
M22-M24 also provides qualitatively similar results.
Overall, the multitude of tests documented above yield robust evidence that dividend payments
are negatively associated with and lead to an decrease in earnings management.
5. Dividend policy, earnings management, and country-level agency
concerns
5.1. Dividends-earnings management relationship, investor protection, and transparency
Thus far, we have established corroborating evidence that dividends relate to earnings management
across a broad spectrum of developed and emerging markets. We now proceed to ascertain whether
the above relationship persists when the sample is partitioned by the degree of country-level in-
vestor protection and transparency measures, and whether and how it varies in these measures. If
firms pay dividends to consume and conceal fewer private control benefits, and thus exhibit fewer
incentives to manage earnings, we expect the negative relationship between dividend paying status
and earnings management to be more pronounced in firms from countries with weak institutions
and low transparency. These firms may be attempting to mitigate country-level agency concerns to
establish reputation or credibility in the market. Employing a large sample of firms from 29 devel-
oped and developing economies with a wide variation of legal protection measures and of differing
degrees of transparency offers an opportune setting to determine such plausible effects.
Our study employs four legal protection metrics and three transparency measures. The former
are (i) a firm’s legal origin (Legal Origin), (ii) the rule of law (Rule of Law), (iii) law and order
(Law & Order), and (iv) the government effectiveness (Gov Effectiveness), and the latter include
(i) financial reporting extensiveness (Report Extensiveness), (ii) financial reporting quality (Interim
Report Quality), and (iii) the governance transparency (Gov Transparency). We follow La Porta
et al. (2000) to employ Legal Origin as a proxy for agency costs at the country level. We include
22
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Rule of Law to measure the extent to which a country enforces its law and order protecting mi-
nority shareholders from La Porta et al. (1998). Law & Order comprises ”law” sub-component
which assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the ”order” sub-component
which assesses popular observance of the law from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Gov
Effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public and of civil services, their independence
from political pressures, the quality of and government’s commitment to policies formation and
implementation from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009). Report Extensiveness captures the
extensiveness of financial reporting by examining the inclusion or omission of 90 accounting items
in annual financial statements in 1995 from the Center for Financial Analysis and Research (CI-
FAR). Interim Report Quality measures the frequency and breadth of interim financial disclosure
from CIFAR. Gov Transparency represents the intensity of governance disclosures used by outside
investors to hold officers and directors accountable from Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004)
(BPS (2004)). The higher these seven metrics are, the stronger is a country’s investor protection
and transparency.
To implement the tests, we replicate our baseline regression (1), while partitioning the sample
into two groups by the median or by a dummy indicator to reflect the strength of each metric -
Strong and Weak. For example, in the case of Legal Origin, our sample of firms is divided into
those from common versus civil law countries, with common law classified as Strong and civil law
as Weak investor protection. Table 6 reports the results, and to conserve space, it only highlights
the coefficients of Div and the associated p-values for the two groups of firms, together with the
t−test for the difference in the Div coefficients between the two groups. This approach allows us to
evaluate whether the relationship between dividend paying status and earnings management varies
for firms operating in countries with strong versus those operating in weak investor protection
or low transparency environments. Panel A reports the results for all countries, while Panel B
highlights the results without the U.S. in the sample.
The results are strongly consistent with our prediction. The coefficients of Div are negative
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and highly significant at the 1% level across all measures of investor protection and transparency
in both Panels A and B. Importantly, the absolute values of the Div coefficient are much higher
for the Weak than for the Strong category, and the differences in the estimates for these two
groups are highly significant at the 1% or 5% level across most proxies of investor protection and
transparency, with the exception of Gov Transparency 12 in both Panels A and B, and Legal Origin,
Rule of Law, and Report Extensiveness in Panel B. The results suggest that dividend payers from
countries with the least investor protection or the lowest transparency display significantly lower
earnings management than do their counterparts from countries with the most investor protection
or the highest transparency. It is plausible that firms from countries with weak investor protection
or low transparency may employ dividend policies associated with lower earnings manipulation to
convey their commitment to shareholder interests.
5.2. Dividends-earnings management relationship and equity issuance
To further verify whether the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management serves
to mitigate country-level agency concerns, we investigate the above link in the context of subsequent
access to external financing. We postulate that if the dividend policy is employed as a means to
build reputation in the capital markets, we should observe dividend payers to exhibit lower earnings
management especially if they plan to subsequently issue equity. Also, we ought to find such
evidence to be more pronounced in firms from countries with weak institutions or low transparency.
This is because firms in these countries may have fewer alternative country-level means to display
their commitment to act in the interests of their investors.
To perform the tests, we replicate the baseline regression (1), shown in model M3 of Table 4,
while controlling for Issue, a dummy indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm issues equity in
years t+1 to t+3 subsequent to dividend payments, as well as its interactions with Div, and with
each of the control characteristics. We report the results in Table 7 across five different models as
we employ the alternative metrics of earnings management. Specifically, models M1-M5 focus on
12Please note that the U.S. is classified as Weak for Gov Transparency measure.
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Accr(J), Accr(D), Accr(F ), Prob(S), and Prob(SEPS), respectively. Panel A reports the results
for all countries, while Panel B presents the results without the U.S. in the sample. To conserve
space, we highlight the coefficients of Div, Issue dummy, and their interaction Div*Issue, along
with the associated p-values.
The results in Table 7 are fully supportive of our conjecture. The coefficients of dividend paying
status are negative and significant across all models in both Panels A and B, with the exception
of model M4 in Panel B, reinforcing the earlier findings that dividend payers are less likely to
display aggressive earnings management. The coefficients of interaction terms (i.e., Div*Issue)
are also negative and strongly significant in all models, with the exception of model M5 in Panel
B. Therefore, dividend paying firms that issue equity following dividend payments, exhibit lower
earnings management than their non-issuing counterparts.
We further assess how the dividends-earnings management relationship varies with subsequent
equity issuance and with differing degrees of investor protection and transparency. We employ the
investor protection and transparency metrics as those in Table 6 - Legal Origin, Rule of Law, Law
& Order, Gov Effectiveness, Report Extensiveness, Interim Report Quality, and Gov Transparency.
We perform the regression analyses as those in Table 7, but the sample is partitioned into two
groups by the median or by the dummy indicator to convey the strength of each investor protection
or transparency metric - Strong and Weak.
Table 8 reports the results and emphasizes the coefficients of Div, Issue, and of their interaction
Div*Issue, and the associated p-values. Results are fully consistent with our expectations. The
coefficients of Div are negative and strongly significant across all investor protection and trans-
parency metrics. The coefficients of differential effects, Div*Issue, are lower for firms in Weak
category than for those in Strong category across all country-level agency-related variables, except
for Legal Origin in both Panels A and B, and Gov Transparency in Panel B. Interestingly, the
coefficients of the differential effects are significant across all investor protection and transparency
measures, except Legal Origin in both Panels A and B, only in Weak, while are insignificant in
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most Strong partitions. Such results underscore that dividend payers that subsequently issue eq-
uity, exhibit lower levels of earnings management than their non-issuing counterparts only in firms
from countries with weak investor protection and high opacity, while not in those from countries
with strong legal institutions and high transparency.
Taken together, the evidence in Tables 7 and 8 suggests that the dividends-earnings management
link is stronger in firms that plan to issue equity following dividend payments, especially in those
with stronger country-level agency concerns. Such evidence renders a valuable support to our
conjecture that the role of dividends associated with a strong commitment to shareholder interests
as manifested by lower levels of earnings manipulation is particularly underscored when firms wish
to establish their credibility in the capital markets.
6. Conclusion
This paper aims (i) to assess whether dividend policy affects earnings management; (ii) to evaluate
whether and how the relationship between dividend paying status and earnings manipulation varies
with country-level investor protection and transparency; and (iii) to entertain a plausible explana-
tion for the variation in the dividends-earnings management link with country-level agency concerns
by exploiting firms’ future access to external financing. Employing a large sample of 23,429 firms
from 29 developed and emerging markets, with wide variation in country-level governance and the
strength of legal institutions, offers an opportune platform to ascertain whether and how dividend
policies exert such effects.
We find a robust negative relationship between the dividend paying status and earnings man-
agement, even after conditioning on a number of variables that have been previously shown to
affect earnings management. The dividends-earnings management relationship is also robust to the
partitions into various subsamples, endogeneity tests, as well as to alternative measures of dividend
policy and of earnings management. Conducting a number of additional tests, we further verify
robustness of our key findings. Subsequent analyses show that the negative relationship between
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dividend policy and earnings manipulation is more pronounced in firms operating in countries with
weak investor protection and high opacity. Finally, the dividends-earnings management link of
firms that issue equity following dividend payments is stronger than that of their counterparts that
do not seek subsequent access to external financing, and only in those with greater country-level
agency problems.
Overall, our findings suggest that firms may employ dividend policies as they have a desire to
consume fewer private control benefits, thereby decreasing the necessity to conceal consumption of
these benefits via aggressive earnings manipulation. Importantly, the negative relationship between
dividend paying status and earnings management is more pronounced in firms from countries with
stronger agency problems. Such evidence implies that dividend policies associated with lower levels
of earnings manipulation may serve to mitigate agency concerns particularly of firms that may
have fewer country-level alternative means to convey their commitment to shareholder interests.
This inference is primarily supported by the findings that the dividends-earnings management
relationship is stronger in firms that subsequently access the equity markets, especially in countries
with weak legal protection and high opacity. It appears that if the benefits of acting in line with
shareholder interests outweigh the costs of reduced expropriation by controlling shareholders, firms
may self-impose the constraint of paying dividends associated with lower earnings manipulation to
capture reputation effects.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics by Country
This table presents the starting year of each country’s data availability (SYear), the mean values of firm-level variables
for the number of unique firms (NFirms), the number of firm-year observations (NFirm-Yrs), the proportion of
dividend-paying firm-years for the full sample period (Full) and for two subperiods (1990-1999 and 2000-2010),
dividend-price ratio (Div/P ), and three different earnings management measures following Jones (1991) Accr(J),
Dechow and Dichev (2002) Accr(D), and Francis et al. (2005) Accr(F ). All variables are defined in Appendix B.
The sample period is from 1990 to 2010.
Proportion of Dividend Payers Earnings Management Measures
Country SYear NFirms NFirm-Yrs Full (Firm-Yrs) ’90-’99 ’00-’10 Div/P Accr(J) Accr(D) Accr(F )
Developed Markets
Australia 1990 937 5,199 0.568 0.848 0.504 0.027 0.072 0.064 0.061
Belgium 2000 96 547 0.693 0.693 0.022 0.054 0.039 0.035
Canada 1990 782 3,366 0.504 0.701 0.445 0.021 0.057 0.052 0.048
Denmark 1996 131 915 0.737 0.871 0.680 0.020 0.053 0.040 0.036
Finland 1997 123 981 0.838 0.950 0.816 0.037 0.052 0.038 0.035
France 1990 701 5,940 0.710 0.794 0.662 0.019 0.055 0.034 0.032
Germany 1990 620 5,094 0.625 0.771 0.535 0.020 0.068 0.050 0.047
Hong Kong 1995 861 6,013 0.554 0.736 0.533 0.026 0.073 0.057 0.053
Italy 1997 242 1,607 0.685 0.745 0.678 0.019 0.053 0.035 0.034
Japan 1990 2,582 29,353 0.886 0.885 0.886 0.013 0.035 0.019 0.018
Netherlands 2001 111 655 0.441 0.441 0.020 0.064 0.039 0.037
Norway 1992 167 1,435 0.779 0.851 0.725 0.028 0.055 0.037 0.035
Singapore 1997 181 1,234 0.814 0.913 0.799 0.032 0.061 0.042 0.039
Spain 1994 144 1,116 0.739 0.735 0.741 0.022 0.052 0.032 0.030
Sweden 1996 236 1,560 0.692 0.850 0.645 0.023 0.051 0.043 0.040
Switzerland 1993 216 1,966 0.735 0.803 0.709 0.017 0.047 0.032 0.030
United Kingdom 1990 2,107 15,968 0.723 0.899 0.602 0.026 0.062 0.048 0.044
United States 1990 7,989 60,969 0.365 0.461 0.300 0.008 0.060 0.058 0.050
Emerging Markets
China 1997 337 1,994 0.483 0.559 0.475 0.016 0.074 0.040 0.037
India 2002 1224 4,202 0.777 0.777 0.019 0.071 0.057 0.044
Indonesia 1997 242 1,753 0.480 0.581 0.467 0.021 0.069 0.046 0.042
Malaysia 1993 708 5,836 0.684 0.868 0.647 0.021 0.063 0.041 0.036
Philippines 2001 111 655 0.441 0.441 0.020 0.064 0.039 0.037
Poland 2004 124 480 0.490 0.490 0.017 0.076 0.044 0.042
South Africa 1997 181 1,234 0.814 0.913 0.799 0.032 0.061 0.042 0.039
South Korea 1995 810 4,417 0.696 0.730 0.691 0.021 0.059 0.038 0.035
Taiwan 2001 611 3,844 0.658 0.658 0.031 0.057 0.037 0.032
Thailand 1997 334 2,513 0.644 0.436 0.677 0.041 0.063 0.044 0.042
Turkey 2003 91 471 0.552 0.552 0.030 0.075 0.052 0.046
By Market Type
Developed 18,656 146,941 0.584 0.675 0.531 0.015 0.055 0.046 0.042
Emerging 4,773 27,399 0.660 0.730 0.653 0.024 0.064 0.043 0.038
Aggregate Measures 23,429 174,340 0.596 0.678 0.557 0.016 0.057 0.045 0.042
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Table 2
Comparison between Dividend Payers and Dividend Non-Payers
This table presents univariate tests of the difference of each firm-level variable between dividend payers and dividend
non-payers across 29 countries. The variables are three different measurements of accruals - Accr(J), Accr(D) and
Accr(F ); market capitalization (MV ); free cash flow (FCF ); book-to-market equity ratio (BM); sales growth
(Salesg); firm age (Age); debt-equity ratio (DE); property, plant, and equipment (PPE); return on assets (ROA);
international accounting standards (IAS); Big 4, 5, or 8 auditors (BigN); closely-held ownership (Chold); and
American Depositary Receipts (ADR). All variables are defined in Appendix B. NObs is the number of firm-year
observations. For each variable, the table shows the p-values associated with the t−test for the difference in mean
values of the dividend payers and dividend non-payers and with the Wilcoxon test for the difference in median
values. The sample period is from 1990 to 2010.
Dividend Payers Dividend Non-Payers Tests for Differences
Variable NObs Mean Median Std NObs Mean Median Std Mean Median
Accr(J) 103,931 0.049 0.034 0.050 70,409 0.075 0.051 0.073 < 0.01 < 0.01
Accr(D) 97,506 0.033 0.024 0.030 62,924 0.066 0.051 0.054 < 0.01 < 0.01
Accr(F ) 97,210 0.030 0.023 0.027 62,464 0.061 0.047 0.050 < 0.01 < 0.01
MV 103,931 12.697 12.579 1.895 70,409 11.333 11.289 1.960 < 0.01 < 0.01
FCF 103,931 0.090 0.084 0.072 54,886 0.009 0.052 0.197 < 0.01 < 0.01
BM 103,931 0.830 0.631 0.767 54,886 0.748 0.521 1.127 < 0.01 < 0.01
Salesg 103,931 0.103 0.076 0.293 70,409 0.231 0.084 0.849 < 0.01 < 0.01
Age 103,931 16.183 15.000 9.989 70,409 11.385 9.000 8.178 < 0.01 < 0.01
DE 103,931 0.761 0.445 1.360 70,409 0.738 0.263 2.284 0.02 < 0.01
PPE 103,931 0.336 0.304 0.208 70,409 0.264 0.195 0.226 < 0.01 < 0.01
ROA 103,931 0.055 0.053 0.081 70,409 -0.063 0.016 0.255 < 0.01 < 0.01
IAS 103,931 0.102 0.000 0.303 70,409 0.089 0.000 0.285 < 0.01 < 0.01
BigN 103,931 0.599 1.000 0.490 70,409 0.636 1.000 0.481 < 0.01 < 0.01
Chold 103,931 0.399 0.400 0.241 70,409 0.377 0.350 0.246 < 0.01 < 0.01
ADR 103,931 0.025 0.000 0.155 70,409 0.013 0.000 0.113 < 0.01 < 0.01
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Table 4
The Relationship between Dividend Policy and Earnings Management
This table presents firm-level OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the earnings management
measure following Jones (1991), Accr(J) in year t + 1, and the key explanatory variable is the dummy
variable Div measured in year t, as are the remainder of explanatory variables. The control variables
include the lag of dependent variable (Accr(J)L); firm size (MV ); free cash flow (FCF ); book-to-market
equity ratio (BM); sales growth (Salesg); firm age (Age); leverage (DE); long-term tangible assets (PPE);
profitability (ROA); the IAS dummy (IAS); a BigN dummy (BigN); an ADR dummy (ADR); and closely-
held ownership (Chold). All variables are defined in Appendix B. Models M1-M3 employ the entire sample
of 29 countries; models M4-M5 focus on the U.S. and non-U.S. subsamples; and models M6-M7 examine
the subsamples of the 1990s versus the 2000s. All regressions include country, industry, and year fixed
effects, and all associated p-values reported below parameter estimates are computed based on standard
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. NObs is the number of observations, and R¯2
is the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is between 1990 and 2010.
Full Sample U.S. Non-U.S. 1990-1999 2000-2010
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Div -1.928*** -0.487*** -0.437*** -0.572*** -0.621*** -0.427***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Accr(J)L 0.286*** 0.224*** 0.226*** 0.217*** 0.204*** 0.230***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MV -0.375*** -0.413*** -0.293*** -0.302*** -0.388***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FCF -0.009 -0.082 0.266 2.221*** -0.743**
(0.98) (0.85) (0.57) (0.00) (0.05)
BM -0.376*** -0.389*** -0.348*** -0.253*** -0.431***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Salesg 0.038 0.166** -0.062 0.057 -0.006
(0.31) (0.01) (0.18) (0.51) (0.89)
Age -0.009*** -0.007** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.006**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
DE -0.017* -0.026 -0.003 0.002 -0.024*
(0.07) (0.12) (0.80) (0.89) (0.08)
PPE -2.620*** -2.511*** -2.698*** -3.323*** -2.276***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ROA -3.044*** -2.861*** -3.430*** -4.681*** -2.705***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
IAS -0.001 3.332*** -0.274*** -0.001 -0.169**
(0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.04)
BigN -0.298*** -0.909*** -0.176*** -0.292*** -0.401***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ADR 0.357*** 0.080 0.277 0.379***
(0.00) (0.51) (0.12) (0.01)
Chold 0.146* -0.101 0.277*** 0.094 0.264**
(0.09) (0.48) (0.01) (0.50) (0.01)
R¯2 7.20% 13.1% 17.3% 18.0% 17.1% 16.6% 17.7%
NObs 143,390 143,390 143,390 50,184 93,206 50,042 93,348
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6
Dividends-Earnings Management Relation, Investor Protection, and Transparency
This table presents firm-level OLS regressions focusing on country-level investor protection and transparency
measures based on the following empirical model,
Accr(J)t+1 = a+ bDivt +
N∑
i
citXit + Fixed Effects + ǫt+1.
The dependent variable is the earnings management measure following Jones (1991), Accr(J), and the key
explanatory variable is the dummy variable Div. The control characteristics are the same as those in Table
4, and all variables are defined in Appendix B. The table presents only the coefficients of Div, i.e., the
estimates of b from the model above, for seven investor protection and transparency measures (i.e., legal
origin, rule of law, law & order, government effectiveness, report extensiveness, interim report quality, and
governance transparency), partitioned by the strength of each measure into Strong and Weak. For each
variable, the table also reports the t−test of difference in mean values between Strong and Weak categories,
and the respective p-values. Panel A reports results based on all countries, whereas Panel B presents
those employing all countries except the U.S. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects, and all
associated p-values reported below parameter estimates are computed based on standard errors adjusted for
heterosedasticity and firm-level clustering. The sample period is between 1990 and 2010.
Country Difference
Institution Strong Weak (Weak-Strong)
Panel A: All Countries
Legal Origin -0.489 -0.563 -0.074
(< .01) (< .01) (0.03)
Rule of Law -0.422 -0.628 -0.206
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01)
Law & Order -0.493 -0.627 -0.134
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01)
Gov Effectiveness -0.452 -0.679 -0.227
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01)
Report Extensiveness -0.466 -0.596 -0.130
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01)
Interim Report Quality -0.428 -0.683 -0.256
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01)
Gov Transparency -0.558 -0.469 0.090
(< .01) (< .01) (0.15)
Panel B: All Countries excluding the U.S.
Legal Origin -0.598 -0.563 0.035
(< .01) (< .01) (0.63)
Rule of Law -0.565 -0.627 -0.063
(< .01) (< .01) (0.40)
Law & Order -0.467 -0.752 -0.285
(< .01) (< .01) (0.04)
Gov Effectiveness -0.485 -0.679 -0.194
(< .01) (< .01) (0.02)
Report Extensiveness -0.512 -0.618 -0.105
(< .01) (< .01) (0.21)
Interim Report Quality -0.474 -0.683 -0.209
(< .01) (< .01) (0.08)
Gov Transparency -0.555 -0.601 -0.046
(< .01) (< .01) (0.85)
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Table 7
Dividends-Earnings Management Relation and Subsequent Share Issuance
This table tests the link between dividend policy and earnings management in
the context of subsequent equity issuance. The dependent variables are Accr(J),
Accr(D), Accr(F ), the probability of the small profit (Prob(S)), and probability
of the small increases in EPS (Prob(SEPS)), measured in year t + 1 in Models
M1-M5, respectively. The key independent variables are a dividend dummy, Div;
a subsequent equity issuance dummy, Issue; and their interaction, Div × Issue.
The unreported control characteristics are the same as those in Table 4, and all
variables are defined in Appendix B. Panel A reports results based on all countries,
whereas Panel B presents those using all countries except the U.S. All regressions
also include country, industry, and year fixed effects, and all associated p-values
reported below parameter estimates are computed based on standard errors adjusted
for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. The sample period is between 1990
and 2010.
Accr(J) Accr(D) Accr(F ) Prob(S) Prob(SEPS)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Panel A: All Countries
Div -0.373 -0.062 -0.063 -0.009 -0.348
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01) (0.09) (0.09)
Issue 2.057 0.562 0.508 -1.118 0.556
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01) (< .01) (0.67)
Div × Issue -0.184 -0.085 -0.070 -0.235 -0.338
(0.02) (< .01) (0.01) (< .01) (0.03)
R¯2 17.0% 81.1% 81.2% 15.5% 14.9%
NObs 118,536 118,536 118,536 118,536 118,536
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls × Issue Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: All Countries excluding the U.S.
Div -0.401 -0.105 -0.094 0.086 -0.575
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01) (0.18) (0.09)
Issue 2.372 0.565 0.524 -0.995 2.118
(< .01) (< .01) (< .01) (0.01) (0.28)
Div × Issue -0.251 -0.040 -0.064 -0.255 0.595
(0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.02) (0.30)
R¯2 16.9% 81.1% 80.8% 7.1% 5.9%
NObs 63,396 63,396 63,396 63,396 63,396
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls × Issue Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix A
Measures of Earnings Management
1. Jones’ (1991) Abnormal Accruals Model (Accr(J))
We employ the absolute value of residuals from Jones’ abnormal accruals model as an earnings man-
agement measure. In this model, total accruals include changes in working capital and depreciation
expenses. Assuming that changes in working capital are a function of revenue growth, and that de-
preciation accruals are proportional to long-term tangible assets, one can estimate abnormal accruals
that cannot be explained by revenue growth and fixed assets. Empirically, accruals from Jones (1991)
model are residuals from the following regression model,
TAccri,t = β0 + β1∆REVi,t + β2PPEi,t + ǫi,t, (2)
where TAccr is firm i’s total accruals in year t, ∆REV is its change in revenue, and PPE is its property,
plant and equipment. We estimate Jones’ model using each firm’s cross-sectional data in a given year
to extract its residual, ǫi,t. Generally, U.S. studies estimate Jones’ model by industry and year. We,
however, run the regressions in a given year for each country, while controlling for industry fixed
effects. We do so because in an international setting, due to a limited number of observations across
numerous industries, industry-level regressions may produce unreliable estimates. Positive residuals
indicate income-increasing manipulations, while negative residuals suggest deflated reported earnings.
We employ the absolute value of the residuals, |ǫ|, as the measure of earnings management.
2. Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) Accruals Model (Accr(D))
In Dechow and Dichev’s accruals model, the standard deviation of residuals from the model is employed
as a proxy for earnings management. Dechow and Dichev examine the quality of accruals, or the
extent to which accruals are related to cash flows. They argue that one of the functions of accruals
is to shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time, because accruals anticipate future cash
collections/payments and reverse when cash previously recognized in accruals is received or paid.
Therefore, high quality accruals should be closely related to cash flows in years surrounding the
recognition of accruals. Accordingly, Dechow and Dichev model working capital accruals as a function
of current, past, and future cash flows, and use the standard deviation of residuals from the model as
a measure of accruals management. Specifically, their time-series accruals model is given by
WCAi,t = γ0 + γ1FCF i,t−1 + γ2FCF i,t + γ3FCF i,t+1 + ηi,t, (3)
where WCA is firm i’s change in working capital, and FCF is the cash flow from operations. This
model, however, focuses on short-term working capital accruals and does not cover long-term accruals.
3. Francis et al.’s (2005) Accruals Model (Accr(F ))
Francis et al. extend Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model by adding sales growth to reflect performance,
and adding PPE to capture other accruals including depreciation. This extension results in the
following model,
TAccri,t = λ0 + λ1FCF i,t−1 + λ2CF i,t + λ3FCF i,t+1 + λ4∆REVi,t + λ5PPEi,t + ξi,t (4)
Francis et al. employ the standard deviation of residuals ξi,t to measure the quality of accruals.
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2011) argue that time-series regressions assume time-invariant parameter
estimates and induce sample survivorship biases. To circumvent these concerns, we employ the pro-
cedure of Francis et al. by estimating (3) and (4) using cross-sectional regressions for each country.
Following Ng (2011), we calculate the standard deviation of residuals using a five-year rolling window
for both Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) and Francis at al.’s (2005) earnings management metrics.
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